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When does the personal vote matter for party loyalty?




When do candidate-centred electoral systems produce undisciplined parties? In
this paper we examine party discipline under open list proportional representation, a
system associated with MPs cultivating personal constituencies. We present a model
explaining how legislators’ preferences and support among voters mediate political
leaders’ ability to enforce discipline. We show that disloyalty in candidate-centred
systems depends on parties’ costs for enforcing discipline, but only conditional on MP
preferences. MPs who share policy preferences of their leaders will be loyal even when
the leaders cannot discipline them. To test the model’s implications, we use data on
legislative voting in Poland’s parliament. Our empirical findings confirm that disloyalty
is conditioned on party leaders’ enforcement capacity and MP preferences. We find
that legislators who contribute more to the party electorally in terms of votes are
more disloyal, but only if their preferences diverge from the leadership. Our results
suggest that the relationship between open lists and party disloyalty is conditional on
the context of the party system.




Scholars of comparative politics have long focused on the role of the electoral system in
mediating how legislators respond to the competing pressures of party and constituency.
Comparative work on party list systems has emphasised the role of incentives for intraparty
competition (Gallagher and Marsh, 1987; Marsh, 1985). The personal vote is especially as-
sociated with the candidate-centred “open list” proportional representation (OLPR), where
individual candidates receive votes and only vote shares determines whether candidates win
seats.1 While candidates of the same party pool their votes on the same list, OLPR creates
incentives for candidates to compete with co-partisans. Because of the importance of votes
for individual candidates, open lists are thought to motivate candidates to cultivate a per-
sonal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Ames, 1995)—a reputation distinct from co-partisans.
In the legislative arena, if roll call voting influences individual reputations, we would ex-
pect incentives for MPs to vote in accordance with constituent demands, even against their
party’s collective position (Carey, 2009)
Because voters determine the priority with which candidates on a list are awarded seats in
the legislature, the presence of such individualising incentives in the electoral context should
translate into greater difficulty in enforcing party discipline. Yet, especially in parliamentary
regimes, the pressure to vote with party leaders is persistently high (Bowler et al., 1999;
Laver and Shepsle, 1999). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, evidence for a relationship between
open-list PR and lower party voting unity has been mixed (Bowler and Farrell, 1993; Carey,
2009; Hix, 2004; Depauw and Martin, 2009; Desposato, 2006; Coman, 2015). Sieberer (2006)
finds, for example, that open list systems in Finland and Denmark represent, respectively,
the lowest and highest party voting unity observed in a sample of Western Europe.
While there is ample evidence that open-lists are important to the electoral and party
1As we discuss below, the mechanics we describe for OLPR are also present in “flexible list” systems as
well. In such systems, voters can influence a party list’s rank order via preferential votes only if candidates
receive a certain quota of votes. Our arguments below apply to any list system with individual candidate
votes, so long as these votes are sufficient to resist party pressures.
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politics in general (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005; Golden and Picci, 2008; Ames,
2001), how this matters for party voting unity is less clear.2 Here we suggest that, while
OLPR indeed makes party discipline more difficult to achieve, disloyal behaviour will be
systematically observed only under certain conditions. Specifically, we argue that when an
MP’s personal vote is a significant contributor to the party’s electoral success the party
leadership is inclined to tolerate disloyalty. However, whether or not an MP will try to take
advantage of his personal vote in this way is depends on the extent to which the MP has
policy disagreements with the party leadership. In other words, open lists should reduce
party voting unity only when there is preference divergence between an MP and the leader
and that MP is capable of attracting a sizeable amount of votes in the electoral district.
We formalise this dynamic with a model accounting simultaneously for party resources,
party preference cohesion, and MPs’ electoral strength. As Borz and Janda (2018) note,
terms relating to party unity and cohesion are used variably in the literature. By party
preference cohesion we refer to the extent to which preferences of individual members are
aligned with the leadership, which in turn derives from the heterogeneity of preferences
among members. The latter concept is equivalent to what Borz (2009) calls “ideological
cohesion.”3
With our model, we describe in particular 1.) how individual loyalty responds in equi-
librium to changes in the leader’s power to enforce discipline and 2.) how the degree of
discipline each member requires for loyalty depends on both her electoral clout and the ex-
tent to which her preferences diverge from those of the leadership. Because of the complexity
of interactions resulting from these factors, we derive expectations about the conditional ef-
fects of preferences and electoral clout on loyalty, while also accounting for varying levels of
party resources. By making the assumptions and predictions precise, we shed light on how
2By “party voting unity”, we mean the extent to which members of a party vote together in the legis-
lature (Carey, 2007), while “disloyalty” refers to individual legislators voting against their party’s position
(Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, 1997)
3Borz (2009) distinguishes between several different concepts of cohesion, including voting cohesion,
which we call “party voting unity” above.
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and when party leaders can counteract the pressures from voters on the party’s rank and
file membership. By separating the effects of institutional incentives from those related to
party discipline, the model helps explain the wide variation in party voting unity observed
among candidate-centred electoral systems.
The model explicitly incorporates two aspects of party organisation: (1) the party leader-
ship’s ability to enforce discipline and (2) the party’s ability to reward loyalty. Consequently,
our model offers insights pertinent to the relationship between party centralisation, party
preference cohesion, and the personal vote (Ceron, 2013, 2016; Borz and de Miguel, 2017).
Ceron (2013) has posited and empirically demonstrated, for instance, that disloyalty “is
conditional on how powerful the whipping resources available to the leadership are.”[p248].
Similarly, Ceron (2016) shows that the impact of factional conflict can be counteracted “when
the party leader is autonomous and can rely on powerful whipping resources to impose dis-
cipline.” As we explain below, our model elaborates the microfoundations of these ideas,
showing that personal vote incentives affect members differentially, with the effect on party
loyalty depending on the leverage of individual legislators vis-a-vis the party leadership.
We test the model’s empirical implications using recorded voting data from Poland’s
Sejm, a parliament elected with an open-list electoral system, where all roll call votes are
recorded, and where patterns of bill sponsorship provide a measure of preferences indepen-
dent of roll call behaviour.
In our empirical analysis, we find that party loyalty corresponds to the electoral leverage
of the individual MP, which, we argue, determines the leadership’s ability to enforce disci-
pline. Further, we find that the effect of MP vote shares on disloyalty is strongest for MPs
that appear to diverge the most from the preferences of their party leaders, which we mea-
sure using patterns of bill cosponsorship outside of their party. We interpret our findings to
suggest that while open-list PR indeed creates significant counter pressures for party voting
unity, we will not observe disloyalty under most circumstances. Disloyalty among MPs with
preferences that diverge sufficiently from the leadership will be observed only when they pos-
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sess sufficient clout. However, even when MPs are loyal to their party, the presence of OLPR
always “matters” in the sense that its personal vote features always play a consequential role
in how discipline is achieved.
Open lists and party discipline
Among proportional representation electoral systems, personal vote incentives are strongest
in open lists (OLPR). In OLPR, voters can vote for a specific candidate within their preferred
party. The votes for candidates within each party list are used to determine the priority with
which candidates will obtain seats in the assembly. In contrast, in closed list proportional
systems (CLPR), voters are limited to a party vote and party leaders determine the rank
by which candidates are awarded seats. This power contributes greatly to party leaders’
capacity to enforce party discipline (Carey, 2007, 2009).
Open lists are in regimes as diverse as Brazil, Latvia, Finland, Denmark, and (formerly)
Italy. Additionally, a number of other countries blend elements of OLPR into their electoral
systems. In flexible list systems,4 the position of the candidate on the list determines the
priority of entering the legislature only if the vote share of the candidate falls below a
threshold.5 The same dynamics for disloyalty that are present in OLPR systems may also
emerge in flexible list systems but will be conditioned on members’ ability to clear the
threshold.6 The OLPR context allows us to focus on the general tendencies arising from
preference votes.
The notion that OLPR creates incentives for candidates to compete with co-partisans
is suggested by an array of research (e.g. Golden and Chang 2001; Ames 1995; Traber,
4Including the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, Iceland, Bulgaria (before
2007), Slovakia, Indonesia, Slovenia, and Peru (Renwick and Pilet, 2016)
5These vary considerably; for example, from 20 % (Czech Republic) to 50 % of the individual vote quota
(The Netherlands)
6Carroll and Nalepa (2019) formalise the spectrum of flexible lists (from open to closed-lists) as the
difference between two electoral thresholds set by the party leader to win a seat in the legislature: a lower
threshold for loyal party members and a higher threshold for disloyal members. The greater the difference,
the more power the party leader has to ensure the members are loyal. Based on this parametrisation, we
conjecture that the results in this paper carry over to flexible lists, moderated by these thresholds.
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Hug and Sciarini 2014). This competition for individual votes implies that MPs should vote
in accordance with constituent demands, even against their party Carey (2007). Without
divergence between a legislator’s preferences and the party, we should not observe disloyalty
to the party even without party pressures (Krehbiel, 1993).
When members’ preferences are in conflict with their parties, leaders may still use their
resources to enforce discipline. Parties may provide rewards to loyal members (Martin,
2012; Fujimura, 2012) or may sanction disloyalty by, for instance, suspending membership or
threatening nominations (Benedetto and Hix, 2007; Andeweg and Thomassen, 2011; Bowler
et al., 1999; Gallagher, 1998).
However, whether the threat of losing a nomination is credible depends on how much
electoral leverage the individual member enjoys. A popular member running on a party list
in OLPR not only secures a seat for herself in the legislature but also contributes her electoral
support to the party as a whole, helping elect less popular members. Hence, punishing
popular members by denying a place on the list can be counter-productive for the party’s
electoral goals.
In OLPR systems, a candidate’s share of votes secured in the district can serve as an
objective measure of that candidate’s electoral value to a party. With this electoral ‘clout’,
MPs are not as easily disciplined into voting with their party. Consider as an example an MP
elected under open lists in the Polish Sejm who typically “wins an overwhelming majority
of votes from [his] district” and thus has “never felt conflicted between party interests and
voter interests” therefore “always follows his voters” (Mojzeszowicz, interview 2010). That
is, the leverage his popularity afforded him vis a vis the party leadership left him relatively
free of party discipline. Compared to other electoral systems, OLPR makes formal and clear
the means of obtaining this ‘clout.’
In sum, loyalty is first mediated by the policy preferences of members. Second, it is
mediated by the sanctions and rewards available to party leaders to pressure members to
vote with the party. Third, it is mediated by members’ electoral leverage to avoid such
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pressure.
The model below allows us to formulate predictions about how preferences interact with
MP clout. From our model, we find that party loyalty is partly determined by the MP-level
variation in the leverage the individual MP derives from a personal vote, which, we argue,
determines the leadership’s ability to enforce discipline. Further, we find that the effect of the
personal vote on disloyalty is strongest for MPs that appear to diverge from the preferences
of their party leaders, measured as their tendency to engage in bill cosponsorship outside of
their party. With regard to party resources available to reward members, although higher
resources make enforcing discipline easier, there is no moderating effect on the leverage
derived from the personal vote. In other words, resources used for rewarding discipline have
the same effect on MPs with a lot of voter support as they do on MPs with low voter support.
The Model
The model presented in this section captures the interaction between a party leader and a
party member. For present purposes, however, the MPs disagreements with leaders’ prefer-
ences may be due to any combination of their individual views, pressure from constituents,7
interest groups or personal networks. Hence, to be as general as possible, we abstract from
the possible reasons that the MPs preferences diverge from those of the leadership and sub-
script the leader’s ideal point “MP.”
We define N = {L,MP} as the set of players.
Our model begins with a party leader charged with implementing a party policy, which
may arise from different forms of decision making processes.8 The game starts with a move of
L, who applies discipline to one of two policies 0 and x from a one-dimensional policy space.9
7Although voters are not formally players in the game, we can interpret the preferences of the MP as
potentially representing them, with the distance between the ideal point of the leader and the member
representing the dual accountability problem facing MPs in OLPR systems (Carey, 2007).
8This includes, for example, a decentralised process involving influence from factions (Ceron, 2016).
9By “applies discipline” we mean that the leader chooses one of two policies with an indication that he
expects members to support the party position. This expectation can be more or less explicit in practice.
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In the case of a governing party, one may think of x as a policy that has been proposed by
the cabinet and 0 as the status quo. In the next stage, the MP chooses whether to follow
discipline, interpreted in the game as voting with the Leader. If the MP complies, the game
ends. In the event of non-compliance, in the following stage, the Leader decides whether to
enforce discipline.10
“Enforcing discipline” refers to actually issuing a sanction for violating the leader’s di-
rective. Empirically, sanctions range from monetary penalties to suspension in caucus mem-
bership rights. The most effective sanction, however, is failing to nominate a candidate for
the party list in the next election cycle. This is precisely what justifies the payoff to the
leader associated with enforcing discipline. It is costlier to discipline high-clout members
than low-clout members. Following the Leader’s decision about enforcing discipline, the
game ends. In short, being loyal is synonymous in our model with following discipline, that
is, with the MPs choosing the same policy as the Leader; being disloyal is synonymous with
violating discipline, that is, with choosing the opposite policy as the leader; and enforcing
discipline is synonymous with the Leader choosing the action “discipline” in the last stage
of the game.
Formally, the Leader’s strategy space is SL = {A1L × A2L}, where A1L = {0, x} , A2L =
{f : A1L × AMP → {0, 1}}, and 1 represents the decision to enforce discipline and 0 repre-
sents the decision to refrain from enforcing discipline. The MP’s strategy space is SMP =
{f : A1L → {0, x}}. The Leader’s and MP’s ideal points are represented by bL and bMP ,
respectively, in a one-dimensional policy space. The utility of the Leader is shaped by his
policy preferences and the cost of enforcing discipline, the last of which depends on the MP’s
clout, represented by π󰂃 [−1, 1]. Hence: UL(sL, sMP ) = −(bL − a1MP )2 − πV (d). MPs with π
close to 1 are more likely to win a seat in the legislature irrespective of how well their party
does in the election as a whole. MPs with π close to -1 depend heavily on the popularity
10Note that our approach shares features with the most influential work on this topic by Kam (2009), who
focuses on party discipline in Westminster systems. Among the important differences is that, in Westminster
systems party leaders are positioned to propose policies. We, however, envision a multiparty context where
leaders would not always have this power.
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of others in their party for retaining their parliamentary seats. The high π MPs are those
colloquially referred to in Poland as the “steam engines,” because they attract many voters
to a party and enable the election of weaker (low π) candidates. In the subsequent discussion
we refer to MPs with π > 0 as “high clout” and to MPs with π < 0 as “low clout”. To
be clear, there is a continuum between low and high clout types. Because high clout MPs
supply a considerable part of the party’s vote share from a given list, they are considerably
more independent in the legislature than MPs, who owe their seats to the party.
V (d) represents the value of enforcing discipline that are internalised by the party leader-
ship. In the case of a high clout type, this effect is transformed into a cost by the coefficient
π, but in the case of a low clout MP, it is transformed into a benefit. The ease with which
leaders can enforce discipline depends not only on the MP’s clout but also on some party-level
characteristics. The parameter d can be thought of as capturing part of party centralisation.
Centralised parties will find it easier to sanction members who violate discipline compared to
decentralised parties. Hence we can think of low values of d as corresponding to decentralised
parties and high values of d as corresponding to highly centralised parties. Note, that the
level of centralisation is independent of the ideological cohesion of the party—how distant
from the leadership are the members’ ideal points. It is also independent of the resources







d if a2L = 1
0 otherwise
The utility of the MP, on the other hand, reflects his concern for the voters, avoiding
punishment for breaking discipline, weighted by his vote share, and the party resources he
receives for supporting the leadership. Hence: UMP (sL, sMP ) = −(bMP−a1MP )2+v(r)+V (d)π
where v(r), is a function transforming the resources the leadership can offer the MP if he












High levels of r characterise members of parties that expect to have access to spoils of
office. Lower levels of r describe members of parties lacking access to power. Such members
have less to lose from disagreeing with the leadership on policy choice whether this entails
breaking party discipline.
In our model, the voters are not a strategic player but the ideal point of the MP could be
interpreted as constituency pressure to deviate from the party leadership’s position. More
broadly, we can interpret bMP as shaped by any parameter that enters the MP’s decision-
making process as long as it is separate from party influence, such as the preferences of
interests or political networks of the MP.
The game above is one of complete information and we solve it for Subgame Perfect Nash
equilibrium in the appendix.
Interpretation
To make empirical predictions, it is useful to present the results as equilibrium outcomes.
Figure 1 does so as a function of the MP’s ideal point, bMP relative to the two exogenously
given policies 0 and x, captured by the location of x
2
, and MP vote share, π. To interpret
the results in a more approachable way, we refer to the representation of parameter values
for high clout MPs in Figure 1 as “Regions” and to the representation of parameter values
for low clout MPs as “Areas.”
—Figure 1 about here—
Recall our assumption that the leader’s ideal point is to the right of the MP’s. Fixing
bMP < bL simply implies that indifferent or undecided MPs will always support the same
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policies as the leader so their preferences are convergent with the leader. This assumption
introduces no loss of generality.




, the midpoint between 0 and x. In the case of the most indifferent (or undecided) MPs
there is no difference between the behaviour of high clout and low clout MPs. The model
makes exactly the same predictions for parameters in Region B as for parameters in Area 3.
Note that indifference between the considered policies, as interpreted here, does not mean
that the MP’s ideal point is exactly x
2
, but that it falls within a distance from that point.
That distance depends on the parameter r representing the resources parties have at their
disposal to reward loyalty. Members of parties with sizable resources will support leadership
more readily than members of parties with fewer resources.
Outside of the indifference region, our results immediately indicate that low clout MPs
will not vote with the leadership under the same circumstances as high clout MPs.
If the high clout MP has preferences that are beyond Region B (e.g. in Region A) he
will do whatever his constituents prefer: he will support 0 if their ideal point is in Region A









. In equilibrium, the high clout MP is never disciplined.
In Area 3, the low clout MP does not require discipline to vote with the leadership.
Extending away from Area 3 is a shaded triangular region (Area 2) where the leadership has
a credible threat of imposing discipline. This credible threat induces the MP to back the
leadership’s choice, because disloyalty would result in sanctions. The region of credible threat
to discipline increases as the MP’s vote share declines, suggesting that MPs with the lowest
clout are most vulnerable to discipline. Area 2’s base is widest for the most negative values
of π. Note, that an increase in d, the parameter representing party organisation and capacity
for disciplining action (which can be thought of as centralisation), is also associated with the
wider base of Area 2, where discipline keeps the low clout MP in line. This implies, all else
equal, that better organised parties find it easier to maintain unity when their membership
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lacks ideological cohesion. Of course, this comparative static holds only for the low clout
case. Even a very well organised party cannot constrain high clout MPs with divergent
preferences. Finally, in the case of constituency preferences corresponding to Area 1, low
clout MPs will act in accordance with their own policy preferences. They will be disciplined,
but given the extreme preferences of this electorate, they prefer to accept sanctions rather
than punishment from voters.
The main empirical implication for MP loyalty is that, for policy preferences and MP vote
share corresponding to Area 2, the shaded triangle in Figure 1, low clout MPs will be more
loyal than high clout with the same preferences. Consequently, parties with more high than
low clout MPs will be less unified than parties with more low relative to high clout MPs. The
conditional effect of vote share on preferences implies that even MPs with extreme policy
preferences can be subjected to pressure from the leadership if their clout is sufficiently low.
The second empirical implication is that resource-rich and better-organised parties enlarge
the area in which MPs and leaders act in concert, whereas parties that are poorly organised
have very narrow areas of MP support for leadership. Resources correspond to the value of
party membership to a member. For instance, parties controlling the cabinet would be higher
in resources than parties that are relegated to the opposition (Carey, 2009). In contrast,
party organisation represents the extent to which disciplining members is a matter of party
routines within the parliament.
Note, that although an increase in resources, r, increases the area where MPs vote to-
gether with the leadership, it affects high and low clout MPs in the same way; that is, there
is no conditional effect of vote share associated with resources. This is not so, however, with
d, the parameter that operationalises a party’s organisational capabilities. Better organised
parties can exert more pressure on MPs with low vote share than on MPs with high vote
share by making them toe the line where their preferences would urge them to do otherwise.11
11We lack the data to operationalise the distance between the two policy proposals in the empirical
analysis below. Note, however, that the closer policy x is from 0, which can be interpreted as the status quo,
the greater the region where the leadership can secure loyalty, as the central region in Figure 1 decreases
in x. This empirical implication allows us to predict what would happen if the choice of policy x were not
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As remarked above, a party’s centralisation can affect its ability to enforce discipline
and degrees of centralisation can map onto the parameters of our model. Decentralised
parties would have their value of parameter d set close to 0, such that the decision of the
leader in the final stage of the game would have very little consequence for his payoff and
the difference between enforcing discipline on the high and low clout member, respectively,
would be miniscule. This would therefore reduce to a decision problem for the party member,
choosing whichever policy he prefers subject to expectations of rewards with resources (r).
Critically, the solution to this decision problem would in no way hinge on the clout of the
party member.12
Empirical Implications
A clear implication of the model above is that observed disloyalty will be largely a function
of the costs of enforcing discipline. Recall that those MPs who are major contributors of
votes to the party—the “high clout” types—are the most costly MPs on which to enforce
discipline, since their sizeable contribution to the party makes the most severe punishment
(denying nomination to the list) impractical for party leaders. In the case of one popular
MP in Poland, for instance, “his name recognition...was so effective that not only did the
six candidates who were expected to win seats in the Torun district enter the Sejm, but
also a seventh person managed to secure a seat” (Ardanowski, interview 2010). As the
model demonstrates, the leader’s ability to enforce discipline on members with such clout
is weak compared to others with less personal following. Imposing discipline upon major
vote-getters is more costly than on others. In the Polish case, a former Vice Speaker notes
that “the President asked fifteen MPs to vote in a way that would violate party discipline.”
exogenous, but chosen by the leadership. A leader maximising party voting unity as demonstrated in the
voting record would set the agenda with policies that are close to the status quo.
12As we suggest above, decentralised parties may have less control over resources to distribute to their
members, because they may need to negotiate the distribution of these resources with other factions of the
party. In this case, not only d would be close to 0, but so would r. The model with such parameter values
would reduce to a decision problem of the party member who would simply choose the policy that it closest
to his ideal point. This result would not hinge on the member’s clout either.
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Whereas normally “disobedience would result in having one’s name removed from the list,
among the fifteen, there were about seven who were so-called ‘steam engines’ and removing
them would result in losing considerable votes” (Wenderlich, interview 2011). By contrast,
an MP without this electoral clout will have much less ability to vote against the party.
One such MP in Poland notes that, “in a vote to appoint constitutional court justices, the
party urged its members to vote against my law school advisor. I asked the caucus whip
for an exemption. It was denied even though it would not have changed the final outcome”
(Karpinski 2009).
The empirical implication is that members on whom enforcing discipline is more costly
should exhibit less loyalty. This can be captured by a continuous concept—an MP’s vote
share. Therefore, observed party loyalty should be lower for MP’s with the largest vote
shares, on average. However, whether enforcement (or lack thereof) will play a decisive
role in loyalty depends on the preferences of the MPs to oppose party policy positions.
Members who most closely share the preferences of leaders should tend to be loyal even
when enforcement capacity is relatively low. Meanwhile, members who prefer to pursue
policies that satisfy constituencies diverging from their party should be disloyal insofar as
party discipline cannot be easily enforced. We therefore expect that the effect of enforcement
power on MP loyalty should be stronger for MPs whose underlying policy preferences appear
to be most different from those of their party leadership. That is, the degree to which MPs
will become more disloyal as a result of higher vote shares is conditional on whether their
preferences diverge from that of the party leadership.
Empirical Analysis
For our empirical analysis, we use data from the Polish Sejm, a parliament elected under open
list PR that provides us with a substantial amount of available electoral and legislative data
suitable to answer the questions raised above. Poland’s open list electoral system clearly
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demonstrates what MPs describe as competition “essentially going on between people on
the same list. Instead of cooperation in competing against opponents from different lists,
they fight each other, competing for media attention, name recognition and even volunteers”
(Karpinski interview 2010). The Polish case has also been associated with relatively weak
party organisations and loyalty (Gwiazda, 2009; Millard, 2008), and thus provides useful
variation for our study.
We use the cross-sectional variation in party loyalty scores to examine the implications
described above. Subsequently, we examine party-level unity scores across votes over time,
focusing on the electoral context facing the party as a whole. We use roll call data from
1997-2005, which covers all votes from the 3rd and 4th terms of the Polish Sejm.13 During
these terms, all roll call votes were recorded and all votes are used in the calculation of these
measures.
We measure the degree of party loyalty using for each MP the measure of “absolute” party
loyalty proposed by Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (1997), which counts abstentions as votes
against the party. This score, which ranges from 0 to 100, simply represents the percentage
of votes on which an MP voted for or against with the party’s overall position, including
cases of abstention as disloyal.14 The party’s position is based on the voting direction of a
majority of the party.15
As described above, party leaders’ enforcement depends on their ability to impose costs
for disloyalty on an individual MP. In general, the leadership makes use of the nomination
13The Sejm since 1997 has been recording and making public all the votes cast in the Chamber.
14Interviews with sources in the Polish Sejm and analysis of archival materials suggests that abstentions
were the most common form of disloyalty against the party, due to harsh formal penalties for explicitly voting
against the party (including fines and expulsion from the party caucus). Still, while it was typical for MPs
to avoid votes, their presence for voting sessions was officially obligatory, with numerous reminders issued by
the caucus whips and possibly sanctions. Thus abstentions were costly enough not to occur without reason,
but are frequent enough to function as the main form of party disloyalty.
15MPs who are independents (not members of any party) are excluded from the sample as are those
members that switch parties during the term from the party list on which they were initially elected. MPs
who leave their party would not have the dynamic we model above in which their importance in the next
election constrains the party leaders. Moreover, their behaviour in terms of voting and bill submission is not
comparable to other members, as it is limited only to a portion of the term. MPs from small parties with
less than 15 members are excluded in order to maintain comparability
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sanction mechanism described above.16 But, due to differences in contributions to the party,
reflecting popularity with voters, some members are less dependent on the party than oth-
ers. In Poland’s open list context, this role is clearly recognised, as one MP notes: “the
conventional wisdom is that this person is the ‘steam engine’ who attracts so many votes
that he will not only secure a seat for himself in the legislature, but will also bring along
a number of other MPs...” Since clout is a continuous concept tied to contributions, we
operationalise this leverage as the vote shares members contribute to the party list. Those
with the greatest vote shares, according to the argument above, should be most successful at
evading party discipline and thus we would expect to find them to be less loyal on average.
The quantity we employ to capture this variation is the vote share—the percentage of votes
a given MP received in his or her district.
—Table 1 about here—
In Table 1, we show the results of an OLS regression of loyalty scores on vote share (Vote
Share), membership in a party in the governing coalition (Govt Party), and the size of the
party, with fixed effects for the term and party-level random intercepts.
First, we examine a basic model that establishes a baseline relationship with our measure
of electoral clout. Here, we find that members responsible for larger vote share are indeed
somewhat less loyal on average, consistent with the notion that discipline is less likely to
be imposed as MPs attain high clout status. Also, we find that the larger parties are, on
average, more loyal, regardless of government status.
In a second model, we introduce an operationalisation of MP preferences. Recall from
above that although MPs with high vote shares should be less subject to discipline on
average, this should be true primarily for MPs whose preferences diverge from the leader’s.
Specifically, only under circumstances where there is some disagreement between MPs and
party leaders should we expect a strong relationship between vote share and loyalty. In
16As one Polish MP commented, “It’s an important instrument of control to offer someone a spot on the
list and assign them to a district” (Jaruga-Nowacka, interview 2009).
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a second model, we examine a closer approximation to the prediction made above: when
enforcement is at its weakest, that is for high clout MPs, those with preferences further
from the party leaders will be less loyal. Naturally, it is not possible for our purposes to
use measures of preferences that derive from voting (Borz and Janda, 2018) and these are
generally inappropriate in parliamentary regimes (Carroll and Poole, 2014). Instead, we take
advantage of another data source with political content—the cosponsorship of legislation.
Importantly, this behaviour was not regulated by parties during the time under study. We
use the bill cosponsorship decisions of members to assess whether an MP appears to have
preferences that diverge from that of their leaders, or perhaps wants to signal these differences
to voters (Crisp, Kanthak and Leijonhufvud, 2004). To capture this, we construct a measure
of the tendency for members to cooperate on legislation sponsored by other parties. In the
Polish Sejm, all legislation initiated as a private bill must be cosponsored by at least 15
MPs and these bills constitute a sizeable proportion of those submitted (40% in the 3rd
[1997-2001] term and 25% in the 4th [2001-2005]). They also constitute 40 (in the 3rd term)
and 50% (in the fourth term) of bills that were actually passed. Thus, almost all members
over the course of these terms cosponsored a bill and consequently can have an outside-party
cosponsorship score assigned. During this time, party rules restricting cosponsorship had
not yet been implemented, leaving us with an informative behaviour reflecting individual
MP decisions. 17 We consider MPs to have indicated divergent preferences from their party
leaders when they co-sponsor proposals for which a majority of co-sponsors come from a
different party. The reasoning behind this measure is that frequent sponsorship of legislation
with MPs from other parties suggests an effort to pursue policies counter to those of one’s
own party leadership—or at least to cultivate a reputation for doing so (Crisp, Kanthak and
Leijonhufvud, 2004; Alemán et al., 2009). Naturally, this proxy cannot be said to account
for all aspects of members’ disagreements with their parties. Here we only assume that
members most frequently cosponsoring outside their party are more likely, on average, to
17After the period under study, changes to party internal restrictions in sponsorship behaviour make later
data inappropriate to serve as a proxy for individual MP preferences.
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have disagreements. In this second model, we include a term interacting vote share with
Outside-Party Cosponsorship, which is a log transformation of the proportion of legislation
an MP cosponsors for which most sponsors are from outside the MP’s party. Naturally,
this measure cannot capture all aspects of preference divergence with an MP’s party, but
identifies MPs that appear to be more likely hold such views.
These results suggest that across our sample, MPs with more outside-party cosponsorship
of legislation have a much stronger relationship between their vote share and their observed
disloyalty. In other words, members with significant electoral clout from their personal vote
tend to vote more disloyally only when ideologically distinct from their party.
—Figure 2 about here—
To better understand these effects substantively, Figure 2 plots the effect of vote share
across the range of outside-party cosponsorship using results from the interaction model.
The graph shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between vote share and
loyalty for an MP with no outside-party cosponsorship. This type of MP may have the clout
to avoid discipline, but likely faces few situations where voting against the party is desirable
even in the absence of discipline. However, for an MP with apparently divergent preferences
(high outside-party cosponsorship activity), the effect is substantively much stronger. We
interpret this as consistent with our expectation above that party discipline is dependent
on parties’ ability to enforce it and is conditional on MPs having preferences ideologically
divergent from the party leadership.
Discussion
Scholars have long investigated how parties reconcile the personal vote incentives of their
members with their own goals of legislative unity. The OLPR electoral system results in
personal votes that make clear the proportion of votes the member secures in her district.
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Since they cannot lose their nomination without harming party performance, we may expect
less discipline and greater disloyalty on average.
However, following Krehbiel (1993), we note that disloyalty is conditional on whether a
legislator’s preferences also diverge from those of the party. When a legislator’s preferences
coincide with the policy supported by the leadership, enforcing party discipline will not
affect voting behaviour. When preferences do diverge, parties can counter the pressures
facing legislators, depending on their organisational capacity.
Our model of discipline under open lists allows us to make clear predictions about the
exact circumstances where disloyalty will be observed. Although disloyalty is a function of
vote share, this is conditional on preferences diverging from the party. An MP with electoral
clout is necessary but not sufficient for observing disloyalty. We then evaluate what party
leaders can do to obtain MPs’ support for party positions, despite personal-vote-seeking
incentives. When parties use rewards to induce loyalty, these resources have the same effect
on low and high clout members. Finally, our model underscores the importance of party
organisations’ institutionalisation. To the extent that there has been a routinisation of
party procedures, parties have an easier time enforcing discipline.
We test this model in a setting with especially suitable electoral and party characteristics.
Poland uses OLPR and records all parliamentary votes, allowing us to measure electoral clout
and party loyalty. During the time under study, cross-party cosponsorship patterns in Poland
allow us an intuitive measure of preference divergence, separate from voting behaviour. In
addition, Poland’s parties, at an intermediate stage of institutionalisation, had not yet clearly
sorted into cohesive ideologically cohesive parties. This creates variation helpful for the
conditional effects in our analysis, compared to established advanced democracies.
Overall, we find that MPs who win more votes in their districts are less loyal to their
parties, but most importantly that members with the most divergent underlying preferences
from their party (captured by sponsorship activity with other parties) are most disloyal when
their vote share would allow them to best avoid enforcement of discipline.
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Our findings are consistent with an important mediating role of institutions. While MPs
are often concerned with their personal reputations, the factors we highlight can explain why
party disunity has often not been observed. We conclude that a large range of variation in
voting unity depends on the nature of party organisations and its enforcement capacity. This
provides an explanation for why personal voting in many advanced democracies—especially
in flexible list systems—has not produced party voting disunity. In most situations, parties
can counteract the personal vote effect of OLPR if they are organisationally capable of
enforcing discipline. While open-list PR can indeed create significant counter pressures for
party voting unity, these would likely manifest themselves as party disunity more commonly
in less-institutionalised party systems, where recruitment processes allow more diverse parties
and where the electorate is more responsive to the individual reputations of candidates.
Parties have strong incentives to avoid the combination of individual electoral clout and
preference disagreement apparent during the period of the Polish Sejm under study. Yet, we
also emphasise that even when MPs are loyal to their party, OLPR still matters in the sense
that the personal vote always plays an important role in how discipline is achieved.
Our formal and empirical analysis provides insight into the wide variation in voting unity
in the context of personal vote incentives. Although open-list PR provides voters with an
opportunity to hold their representatives individually accountable, this opportunity is not
in itself sufficient to produce MPs with behaviour that diverges from their party leaders.
Instead, institutionalised parties are likely to be able to counteract the influence of the
personal vote on party loyalty. Parties have strong incentives to avoid the combination of
individual electoral clout and preference disagreement apparent during the period of the
Polish Sejm under study.
In summary, the personal vote incentives of OLPR are persistently important for leg-
islative voting because the nature of discipline is shaped by the leverage provided to MPs
under the electoral system, as well as by the incentives parties have faced to recruit a diverse
membership. We believe these results contribute to explaining the wide variation in the
20
apparent unity of parties in candidate-centred electoral systems.
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Table 1: Party Loyalty Across MPs
(1) (2)
All All




Vote Share X Outside Cosponsorship -3.050***
(1.154)
Govt Party -0.343 -0.444
(0.875) (0.865)
Party Size 0.023*** 0.026***
(0.007) (0.007)





Number of pid 11 11
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Comparative Statics: Low Clout MPs and High Clout MPs
Figure 2: Effect of Vote Share on Party Loyalty, Conditioned on Outside-Party Sponsorship be-
haviour
Appendix
Recall that the game presented in section 2, Enforcing Discipline, 〈N,S, U〉, is defined byN =
{L,MP} SL = {A1L × A2L}, where A1L = {0, x} , A2L = {f : A1L × AMP → {0, 1}× {0, 1}},
and SMP = {f : A1L → {0, x}} and UL(SL, SMP ) = −(bL − a1MP )2 − πV (d)
UMP (SL, SMP ) = −(bMP − a1MP )2 + v(r)− V (d)π.
We made the following assumptions about the parameters of the model
V (d) =
󰀝









r > 0, π󰂃 [−1, 1]
The first proposition states the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria for the “low clout” type
of MP (π < 0) and the second proposition states the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria for
the “high clout” type of MP (π > 0).
Proposition .1 If the Leader is dealing with a low clout MP, the following strategy profiles
form a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium:


























≤ bMP ≤ x2 +
r−πd
2x
and bL ≥ x2
Proposition .2 If the Leader is dealing with a high clout MP, the following strategy profiles
form a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium:













and bL ≥ x2
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≤ bMP ≤ x2 +
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2x
and bL ≥ x2













and bL ≥ x2
Proof The Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the game 〈N,S, U〉 are calculated by backward
induction. Note that in the last period of the game, L chooses to enforce discipline only on low
clout MPs, because −(bL − a1MP )2 − πV (d) ≥ −(bL − a1MP )2 if and only if π < 0. Given this,
we analyze the cases in which the MPs follow the leadership’s choice separately for the low
and high clout MPs. In the case of the low clout MP, BRMP (x) = x iff −(bMP − x)2 + r ≥
−b2MP + πd, which is the case if and only if bMP ≥ x2 +
r−πd
2x
, while BRMP (0) = 0 iff




best responses of the low clout MP fall into three regions:










≤ bMP ≤ x2 +
r−πd
2x






⇒ BRMP (x) = x ∧BRMP (0) = x
Given these best responses, we proceed to find the optimal choice of the Leader. In region 1,
L will choose x over 0 when dealing with a Low Clout MP if and only if UL(x,BRMP (x)) ≥
UL(0, BRMP (0)), which is equivalent to −b2L−π ≥ −b2L, simplifying to π ≤ 0, which is always
the case, since in the low clout case, π < 0 In region 2, L will choose x over 0 whenever
UL(x, x)) ≥ UL(0, 0), equivalent to −(bL − x)2 ≥ −b2L which simplifies to bL ≥ x2 In region 3,
L will choose x over 0 when dealing with a low clout MP if and only if UL(x, x) ≥ UL(0, x),
which is equivalent to −(bL − x)2 ≥ −(bL − x)2 − π, simplifying to π ≥ 0, which is always
the case, since in the low clout case, π < 0.
In the case of the high clout MP, BRMP (x) = x iff −(bMP − x)2 + r ≥ −b2MP , which is
the case if and only if bMP ≥ x2 − r2x, while BRMP (0) = 0 iff −b
2
MP + r > −(bMP − x)2,
which is the case if and only if bMP <
x
2
− r2x. Thus, the best responses of the high clout
MP fall into three regions:










≤ bMP ≤ x2 +
r
2x






⇒ BRMP (x) = x ∧BRMP (0) = x
Given these best responses, in analogy to the high clout case, we proceed to find the
optimal choice of the Leader. In region 1, L will choose x over 0 when dealing with a
high clout MP if and only if UL(x,BRMP (x)) ≥ UL(0, BRMP (0)), which is equivalent to
−b2L geq − b2L, which means both actions are optimal. In region 2, L will choose x over 0
whenever UL(x, x)) ≥ UL(0, 0), equivalent to −(bL−x)2 ≥ −b2L which simplifies to bL ≥ x2 In
region 3, L will choose x over 0 when dealing with a low clout MP if and only if UL(x, x) ≥
UL(0, x), which is equivalent to −(bL − x)2 ≥ −(bL − x)2, which means both actions are
optimal.
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